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This post originally appeared on The Cosmopolitan Globalist.

WHAT MAKES UKRAINIANS SPECIAL?

The largest humanitarian distribution center in the city of Dnipro in eastern Ukraine. Photo by darvik.photography@gmail.com

CHRISTINE QUIRK, NICE

Nothing, writes Christine Quirk, who has been watching Ukrainians do the hard work of figuring out how to be a democracy. We can do it, too.

If you’ve just tuned in, Ukrainians are superheroes who repel Russian invaders using tractors, Molotov cocktails, and javelin missiles. Led by a former comedian who has buoyed citizens’ spirits through live videos, consolidated NATO, and shamed the shameless in Europe, Ukrainians defend their nation with style and humor, despite overwhelming odds.

Ukrainians, for good reason, have inspired the world. But what makes them so special?

Nothing.

I have been working on democracy and governance programs in Eurasia since 2004, and in Ukraine since 2006. I’ve observed elections and worked on campaigns. As a public opinion research consultant for a variety of clients, I have watched and analyzed hundreds of focus groups over the last five years on topics ranging from the presidential election to LGBTQI rights to pension reform. I have heard ordinary people from every corner of the country describe their frustration and pride in the country’s democratic development. No matter how many grievances they have with their leaders—and they have many—that they vote in fair elections and can speak their minds freely means that Ukraine is a democracy.

It hasn’t always been that way.

In 2004 in what became the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians came to Maidan, in the center of Kyiv, to protest a rigged presidential election. Everyone thought Ukrainians were superhuman then, too. They weren’t. They were just good organizers who believed their democracy was worth fighting for.

The Orange Revolution didn’t happen by accident. It was hard work. Everyone knew the second round of the 2004 Presidential election would be rigged in favor of Viktor Yanukovich, who was the personal choice of term-limited incumbent Leonid Kuchma. Pre-election polls showed Yanukovich was unlikely to win without cheating. When the firehose of state administrative resources was directed toward ensuring a Yanukovich victory, democratic forces (the “Oranges”) stood no chance.

In preparation, throughout 2003 and 2004, Ukrainians worked with closely with the Serbian civil society group Otpor. Otpor had organized the non-violent effort to overthrow Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, a strategy that was based in part in how Poles fought against Martial Law in 1989. Using principals of non-violence laid out in influential texts such as Gene Sharp’s The Politics of Nonviolent Action, leaders of Ukrainian civil society groups like PORA! adapted the lessons to Ukraine’s context.

Activists knew they could use people’s outrage over having their vote stolen as an organizing tool. But they had a lot of work to do.

Every aspect, from the strategic to the tactical, was planned in advance. Pre-election, they had convinced rivals Victor Yushchenko and Yuliia Tymoshenko to campaign as a united front on behalf of the Oranges. Political activists worked to build behind-the-scenes support from legislators, local leaders and even a few oligarchs—those who hadn’t murdered anyone—who could be persuaded to switch sides. Domestic election monitors trained to document and report violations were deployed in every corner of the country. Lawyers strategized how to challenge the violations in the courts, knowing denied petitions would hand them a PR victory. Communications specialists were ready to keep Ukrainians informed about all the ways their votes were stolen. Grassroots organizers used clever tactics—called “softening the ground”—to reduce fear among Ukrainians by showing that a lot of people just like them were fed up too, and ready to take the risk of going to the streets in protest.

When Yanukovich was announced the winner despite election monitors’ reports of widespread fraud and exit polls that showed a clear victory by Yushchenko, the Oranges were ready to mobilize.

Despite the threat of violence, people from around the country came to Maidan. They knew that international and domestic election monitors said the election was neither free nor fair. They weren’t afraid because they saw how many others just like them were facing down police and soldiers. “They can’t shoot everyone” is an operating principle of non-violent protests. Critically, security services refused to shoot protesters, demonstrating the power of non-violence and possible sympathy within the services for the protestors’ message. Under pressure, oligarch-controlled Channel 5 switched sides to tell the truth about the stolen election. Momentum shifted and the Central Election Commission declared a do-over of the election. The compromise candidate few loved but most united behind, Viktor Yushchenko, won.

The Orange Revolution influenced Ukraine’s democratic trajectory in at least two important ways: First, it built the foundation of the civil society which is now supporting the war effort. It taught activists how to unite in broad coalitions, communicate effectively about their goals, and organize people to do the unsexy work of building a sustainable movement. Second, it gave young Ukrainians a deeply rooted sense of their ability to change a government that does not respect the will of the people.

Ukraine stagnated economically and politically in the following years. People became disillusioned with elected leaders who refused to address the issues they cared most about: a poor economy, lack of rule of law and pervasive corruption. Ukrainians hoped President Viktor Yanukovich, who had been legitimately elected in 2010, would keep his promise to sign the parliament-approved EU accession agreement. The agreement would push Ukraine to make the political and economic changes necessary to join in the future. It signalled that Ukraine wanted to take a western trajectory. Even then, a majority of Ukrainians supported it.

Under Kremlin pressure, Yanukovich refused to sign the agreement in November 2013. The country exploded in anger. The Revolution of Dignity—Ukraine’s second revolution in ten years—began.

The organizational foundation built for the Orange Revolution proved solid. The next generation of Ukrainians, who dreamt of a European future, and others who were fed up seeing different rules for the wealthy and well-connected again came to Maidan in the freezing cold. For months, volunteers provided the food, shelter and medical support that made such a large-scale urban protest possible in the middle of winter. To keep spirits up, top Ukrainian entertainers performed and priests held masses in a carnival atmosphere. Everyone knew why they were there: Ukraine’s democracy and European future was at stake.

The protest ended when Yanukovich fled to Russia, but not before snipers opened fire on a crowd of protesters, killing at least 120, and touching off violent street battles. Ukrainian director Sergei Loznitsa’s 2014 documentary Maidan shows the elaborate organization, the sense of common purpose, and the extraordinary violence of the Revolution of Dignity. Much will look familiar to those tuning in to Ukraine for the first time. Ukrainians punch back hard.

The Verkhovna Rada voted to oust the AWOL Yanukovich for failing to show up for work. A caretaker government was formed, which signed the EU accession agreement. Petro Poroshenko was elected with 55 percent of the vote in the May 2014 election.

In between and since the Orange Revolution and The Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainians have pressured their government to crack down on corruption. They’ve involved themselves in the boring machinery of local government by taking advantage of Ukraine’s decentralization policy, which has given local communities more control over budgets. Because of hard work of multiple NGOs that are fighting the battle against Russian disinformation from multiple angles, Ukrainians have become sophisticated consumers of online information. They vote in elections, even if they don’t like their options. It’s taken twenty years to get to this point, but the progress shows every day of this awful war.

Ukrainian democracy often takes two steps forward, one step back. But Ukrainians won’t let their authoritarian neighbor rob them of the democracy they’ve been working on for twenty years. The only thing that has surprised me over the last two weeks is that Putin didn’t know this.

When the war is over, Ukrainians will lead the effort to build democratic institutions in places like Belarus after Lukashenko and post-Putin Russia. They might even have some lessons for Americans and Europeans.

They’re not special. They’re just democrats.

Christine Quirk is public opinion research consultant who specializes in emerging and declining democracies. She has been working in Ukraine since 2006 for a variety of NGO, government and private sector clients. More information about her work and clients can be found at www.quirkglobalstrategies.com. She lives in France and tweets at @cequirk.

Survey research is a tool. Like all tools, it can be used for good or evil.

It remains the best way to understand divisions in public opinion and the context that explains them. Once the data reveal the depth and breath of societies’ fault lines, mitigating or exploiting the divisions becomes easier.

Pollsters working on the side of good do their best to mitigate those divisions. If the goal is exploiting divisions, however, polling can be the devil’s tool.

As a general policy, Quirk Global Strategies works on the side of good. We’ve talked a lot on this blog about how we use polls and focus groups to help our clients navigate complicated environments and advance a positive agenda. The type of strategic research which QGS conducts rarely appears in public. It’s used to guide decisions in support of and to measure the success of political campaigns, advocacy campaigns and program design or evaluation. Benign stuff, really.

What Would the Devil Do?

Back in the 2016 US election, there was a lot of talk about how Russian interests exploited societal divisions to benefit Donald Trump. I believed at the time, and still do — though I haven’t seen proof — that these operators relied on polling to identify segments of the US population most receptive to divisive election messages. The degree to which Russia interfered is hard to measure. However, exploiting existing divisions in society has long been part of Russia’s global playbook. Polling in the US is easy to do. There are plenty of US pollsters who would take Russian money. There are lots of divisions to exploit. Why wouldn’t they use research to inform their strategy?

If I were to interview the devil on how he uses polling to advance his agenda, I would probe on the example from the US: Who? When? How? Which issues? How much did you pay your pollster?

Does the Devil Poll in Ukraine?

Having worked in Ukraine since 2006 and watched hundreds of focus groups there in the last six years, I know the fault lines that transect Ukrainian society. Ukraine’s democracy is fragile. Corruption is a major issue. If I were the devil (I am not), I would ask myself which issues would most effectively undermine Ukrainians’ support for their government and increase societal tensions. I would commission research to identify the top issues and the populations most receptive to divisive messages, just to make sure I was on track.

Anyone who has spent as much time mucking around in Ukraine as the Russians already knows where the fault lines lie. Russia has sophisticated “political technologists.” Ukraine’s data collection capacity is robust. Survey research is cheap. They should be smart enough to check their assumptions against hard data, especially if they plan high-risk political investments. It would be dumb not to.

Is There Any Evidence?

The Plot to Destroy Ukraine” by the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI), is an excellent report. Seeing the suggestion in print that Russians use opinion research in Ukraine shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did. Here’s a paragraph that pretty clearly lays out the devil’s usual polling strategy:

The energy axis of Russia’s unconventional operations was detected early by Kyiv and measures were taken to try to control its impact. Ukrainian officials believe that they have succeeded in countering this initial thrust, though Russia could go much further. Energy was one of many axes by which Russia was and is trying to undermine the credibility of the Ukrainian government. The aspiration is to create a domestic political crisis that Russia can capitalise upon to bring politicians willing to reach an accommodation with Moscow to power. Using extensive social surveys of Ukrainian citizens, the Russian government has been working out which pressures lead to a domestic reaction and which do not. [italics mine]

The paragraph ended with a tantalizing footnote but rather than evidence, it was just a link to some public polling.  It did not answer any of my questions about how Russia uses opinion research in Ukraine: Who? How? When? Which issues?

Why Wouldn’t You?

It’s not surprising that Russians use opinion research to support their operation in Ukraine, just as they likely did in the US. Polling is something that everyone does but no one talks about, especially if you have bad intentions. If a tool exists that helps you advance your agenda, why wouldn’t you use it?

Quirk Global Strategies prefers to use opinion research for good rather than evil. If you want to learn more about how we can help you advance your agenda anywhere in the world without invading anything, contact us.

Haven’t heard of Mariupol? There’s a good chance you’ll hear a lot about this heavily industrialized city in Ukraine’s south in the coming weeks, for the wrong reasons.

Almost three years ago, I observed the first round of the Presidential election in Mariupol. I described the experience in this medium post.

I’ve been back there several times since to watch focus groups. A lot has has changed! The city has benefitted from more attention from Kyiv and a young mayor. There’s now a smooth, fast highway from Zaporizhiya and more regular train service. The gardens and parks around town have been spruced up. There are a couple good restaurants and a lively contemporary art scene. Focus group participants volunteer their pride in the town. It’s a pleasure to visit, and not just because I like to look at the mosaics on its abandoned yacht club.

There’s more to it than meets the eye, too. A centuries-old population of Pontic Greeks live in and around Mariupol. Indeed, there are villages on the outskirts of town that look and feel Greek. They soften Mariupol’s otherwise hard visage. Ukraine is more diverse than it gets credit for, especially around the Black Sea.

What Hasn’t Changed in Mariupol

What hasn’t changed since 2019 is Mariupol’s position 25 km from the Russian border. It’s a strategic port city on the Sea of Azov and important for Ukraine. It was occupied when Russia invaded in 2014 and its villages were shelled. Sitting on the Line of Control, it’s hard to imagine it won’t be the first major city to be overrun if/when Russians push even farther into Ukrainian territory.

Why should anyone care about the fate of a mid-sized Ukrainian city, pushed up hard against the Russian border? The biggest threat to Russia is hardly NATO expansion. Russia is threatened by the vibrant democracy on its border, defended by ordinary people like the ones I met doing tedious but critical election day work. Twice in the last two decades Ukrainians have taken to the streets to remove corrupt, undemocratic governments. They’d do it again, too. Russia compares unfavorably by every democratic measure and Putin knows it. That’s the expansion he is concerned about.

There aren’t many success stories in this region. Ukraine is one of them and it’s 100% the result of Ukrainians’ commitment to democratic governance and holding their leaders accountable.  I’ve seen survey data that say a third of Ukrainians would take up arms to defend the country against a Russian re-invasion. I don’t know if, compared to other countries, that number is high or low, if it’s enough or totally insufficient. But I believe it.

Ukrainians know how fragile their independence and their democracy is. I saw it on that election day and I hear it in every focus group. They think it’s worth defending. They’re right. Healthy Ukrainian democracy is in Europe’s and North America’s interests. It’s in Russia’s interest, too.  But if Mariupol goes down, no one — especially in Europe — should be surprised at what comes next.

Contact QGS

Quirk Global Strategies has been working in Ukraine since 2006. In the past five years, Christine Quirk has observed hundreds of focus groups on topics ranging from politics and political parties, Russian disinformation, LGBTQ rights, women in politics and human rights in every corner of the country. Contact us and we can talk to you about your research options, with or without Russian occupiers.

 

With up to three elections scheduled in 2019 (presidential primary and run-off, and parliamentary ballots), Ukraine is going to be the subject of a lot of international attention in the coming months. With an unpopular president, unpopular political parties and a disillusioned, undecided electorate, the outcome of all these contests is anyone’s guess.

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